RADNET presently has no reports detailing releases of anthropogenic radioactivity from Canadian nuclear power plants. A variety of safety issues, however have been in the news (Vancouver Sun, Jan. 10, 1997; Toronto Star, Jan. 17, 1997; Bangor Daily News, Jan. 18-19). A primary safety concern has been the discovery of corrosion in a number of feeder pipes at the Point Lepreau Plant in New Brunswick which carry pressurized superheated water used for cooling the reactor. Some pipes are corroded as much as 30%; the corrosion rate on these pipes is reported to be 4 times the design rate (BDN pg. A9). Other problems previously discovered include sagging tubes that hold uranium fuel bundles in the reactor core, a continuing leak of radioactive water inside the reactor unrelated to the problem of the pressure tubes, and the failure to replace a reactor port shield after routine maintenance allowing some radiation to escape within the plant (BDN pg. A9). Another interesting incident which occurred in Oct. 1995 at the Point Lepreau facility was the sucking into a 9,000 horsepower hot water transfer pump of a wooden pipe cutter inadvertently left near the pipe intake; damage for repairs from this one incident was 7.4 million dollars; the Jan. 18-19, 1997 article in the Bangor Daily News indicates that "2.2 lb. of wood and 30 metal screws remain inside the cooling system probably lodged against the uranium fuel." Needless to say Point Lepreau officials say the debris in the reactor core is of no significance.

Point Lepreau is only one of 22 Canadian (Candu) reactors; initial reports indicate the corrosion problems could be endemic to all of these reactors. Candu officials indicate corrosion is occurring at the rate of .1 to .15 mm per year and "at that rate it would take 4 or 5 years before the pipes need to be replaced" (Xinhua News Agency, Jan. 10, 1997, via Lexis-Nexis). One other Canadian reactor, Gentilly 2, is located directly upwind from Maine just south of Quebec, and along with Point Lepreau and the Seabrook facility is one of the 3 other source points of anthropogenic radioactivity having the most likely potential to impact the bioregion of Maine in addition to the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant.

The Canadian Candu reactors have been suggested as a likely candidate for recycling US and Russian weapons grade plutonium by burning the plutonium after it has been mixed with uranium fuel (MOX). This scenario, recently proposed by the Dept. of Energy as a politically necessary disposal technology in addition to vitrification, would require modification of the Canadian reactors (as well as any American reactors used in this scheme). Unfortunately, the use of plutonium in the MOX fuel program creates larger amounts of radioactive waste which contain almost half the original plutonium (Toronto Star, Jan. 17, 1997). The discovery of extensive corrosion in Canadian reactors does nothing to generate confidence in the DOE plutonium MOX disposal scheme which will necessitate approximately 30 years of Candu reactor operation for several or more reactors, in the case that Canada participates in the proposed DOE plutonium disposal program.
 

C. Russian Nuclear Power Plants

The subject of the unsafe Russian RBMK and other nuclear power plants is a Pandora's box of radiological disasters in waiting and worthy of a separate net site in itself. The sixteen remaining RBMK reactors along with other older reactors in Eastern Europe are the most likely sources of future hemispheric wide releases of radioactive contamination. Several interesting safety reports on RBMK reactors in the Soviet Union and the sponsorship of their operation or return to service by U.S. interests will be posted here when they become available; however Russian nuclear power plant effluents, as well as the waste inventories and radioactive releases from other nuclear power plants throughout the world are not the focus of RADNET due to a lack of personnel and resources, and citations of research pertaining to these many source points will not be listed unless an unusual release of radioactivity is reported to RADNET. Links to European and other nuclear information sources documenting the effluents and public safety controversies pertaining to these very dangerous plants can be found in RADNET Section 13, RADLINKS, Part 2B. Persons and/or organizations with information pertaining to any nuclear power facilities outside of the United States please contact RADNET by email or surface mail if you wish your site listed in RADLINK world wide web links (RADNET Section 13).

Copinger, D.A. (1995). Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants. Nuclear Safety. 36(2). pg. 218-234.

• RBMK reactors are considered one of the higher risk designs (pg. 219).... "the most challenging concept advanced during the plenary sessions was the desperate need for developing a safety culture at the highest level." (pg. 220).
• A major problem for older type VVER 230 reactors is embrittlement of vessel material and, especially, the measures to reduce the possibility of thermal shocks... "cold overpressurization of the whole system and transients caused by a loss of coolant accident (LORCA) or steam line break with cold-leg injection are of particular concern in this regard." (pg. 222).
• "Preventing a nuclear accident in any country should be a priority for the U.S. nuclear industry, because a serious accident would jeopardize opportunities to sell new nuclear power plants both to U.S. utilities and in foreign markets." (pg. 219).

• This text provides an overview of the Soviet production of nuclear power and military uses to give a general idea of the radiation legacy of the former Soviet Union.  It includes the following topics: uranium ore, uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel production, nuclear power plants, naval applications, nuclear research, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions and storage of radioactive wastes.

von Hippel, Frank and Jones, Suzanne. (September 19, 1997). The slow death of the fast breeder; plutonium nuclear power plants. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 5(53). pg. 46.

• "Japan's plutonium program has been hammered by accidents at the three principal prototype facilities operated by the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC), the agency created by the Japanese government to develop breeder reactors and plutonium fuel-cycle technologies."
• "...the problem of disposing of 50 tons of Japanese plutonium accumulating in Britain and France remains. If this plutonium is not to be stored indefinitely in Europe, Japan's utilities will somehow have to get a large number of their reactors licensed for mox fuel. Bu even if, say, 10 reactors are licensed, disposal via the mox route would take more than a decade."
• An important review of the growing debacle pertaining to the futility and high costs of spent fuel reprocessing in Japan, France, Germany and Britain as well as an additional commentary on the twilight of the nuclear era from the angle of the plutonium problem.

(January 19, 1999). Nuclear power: German plan to phase out nuclear power raises questions across Europe. Europe Environment. Section No. 537.

• "Germany's Environment Minister Juergen Trittin published the key points of a draft Government Bill to phase out nuclear power on January 14 in Berlin.  The previous day, the Greens and their SPD Government allies had agreed to introduce legislation banning the reprocessing of German nuclear waste abroad from the end of the year, notably in France and Great Britain."
• "The first article of the draft Bill calls for the phased withdrawal from nuclear power as a means of generating electricity in Germany.  The Bill also stipulates that no further authorization will be forthcoming for new nuclear energy installations, and that the reprocessing of spent fuel will be prohibited from January 1, 2000.  Nuclear waste will thereafter be stored."
• "The proposed legislation will require operators of existing atomic installations to build storage facilities close to power stations in order to avoid the transport of waste."
• "The United Kingdom, has warned of the dire financial consequences of any breach of existing agreements."
• "France is calling on Germany from the beginning of 1999 to resume the repatriation of its waste reprocessed in France, a process halted following a scandal surrounding the contamination of shipments."
• "Following a meeting in Paris on January 14 with the French Secretary of State for Industry, Christian Pierret, Environment Minister Juergen Trittin pledged to ensure that nuclear waste reprocessed at Cogema's Cap la Hague plant in North-Western France is repatriated to Germany.  He acknowledged that Germany has an obligation to take back its waste and cannot pass on responsibility for the storage of a substance as dangerous as plutonium to another country."
• "The German decision to cease reprocessing nuclear waste may fuel a serious financial dispute with France.  Cogema claims the decision will cost the company as much as FF30 billion.  Some 3,800 tonnes of German nuclear waste have been reprocessed at the Cap La Hague plant.  Much of the reprocessed fuel and waste is still in France despite radioactive waste management legislation banning long-term storage in France."
• "British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) insisted on January 14 that the reprocessing of German waste is covered by legally binding contracts. ...while the reprocessing of German waste is an important activity, it represents only 10% of orders at its Thorp reprocessing plant at Sellafield. ... BNFL is adamant that Germany cannot rescind these contracts without paying due compensation."

• "The activity concentrations of ²³⁸Pu, ^239,240Pu, ²⁴¹Am, ²⁴²Cm and ²⁴⁴Cm in airborne effluents and discharged activities were determined for several time periods during 1988 and 1989 and for the whole of 1990 at a V-1 nuclear power plant." (pg. 191).
• "It was found that these radionuclides were present in airborne effluents in the range ~1 to 50 µBq m-3." (pg. 191).

• Greatest contamination was noted in samples taken near the plant.

• Leakage of transuranics is measurable in water sources adjacent to nuclear reactors due to the large volumes of cooling water discharged from the reactors.

Also see the extensive citations in RAD7: Plume Pulse Pathways.

Boelskifte, S. (1985). The applications of Fucus vesiculosus as a bioindicator of ⁶⁰Co concentrations in the Danish Straits. J. Environ. Radioactivity. 2. pg. 215-227.
 

June 1, 1984

Danish Strait

Seaweed

60Co

3.91 Bq/kg dry weight

• Reflects contamination from 2 Swedish nuclear power plants (Barseback and Ringhals).

• "during the period August 1974 to June 1985 Bailey's Cove received a quite substantial release of radiocesium..."
• This data is noted as being one order of magnitude greater than control specimens collected away from the plant outfall.
• Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company annual radiological surveys report much lower levels of ¹³⁷Cs in seaweed, and in most subsequent years, none at all in this media.

• The projected accumulation of plutonium (for all isotopes) from the USA nuclear power industry is estimated at over 1000 megacuries by the year 2020.
• The current accumulation of ²³⁹Pu (only) is 9,000,000 Ci (145.8 MT).

• Contamination levels determined by distance from the reactor outflow and the liquid radionuclide effluent release schedule.

• These fish specimens were collected during a five month fishing season (April-August 1984) below the plant liquid effluent outfall.
• The official release record for ^134,137Cs from 4/26 - 8/14/84 was 193 mCi; for ⁶⁰Co: 17.2 mCi.

• "New York harbor is currently the zone of most rapid deposition of sediments containing radionuclides, some of which were released from a nuclear reactor about 60 kilometers upstream of the harbor." (pg. 179).