The fundamental basis of the MYAPC as well as of any nuclear power plant is the creation of wealth based on the generation of nuclear waste. The essence of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme is the collection of the profits resulting from boiling water using fissile material while avoiding the costs of waste disposal and safe plant operation. Federal law permits, and in fact, encourages, this wasteful process as an unfortunate footnote to the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear technologies which it spawned. Nuclear power would never have evolved as a principal means of generating electricity without politically based government subsidies for the design and construction of nuclear plants and the training of its operators and overseers (especially from the nuclear navy) or without the legal loopholes provided by the incompetence of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) allowing evasion of the costs of waste disposal and decommissioning. These subsidies, once the basis for the growth of the nuclear power industry, no longer serve any useful purpose. The buy now pay later philosophy inherent in these subsidies is now a constituent of the declining viability of this industry.

A second component of the decline of the economic viability of the nuclear power industry is that the current propensity of the federal government to deregulate the electrical power industry undermines any remaining benefit derived from the federal subsidies which have artificially supported the nuclear industry up to the present time. It is not the purpose of RADNET to analyze or document this change in federal policy favoring less government regulation, but the fact remains that even with extensive government subsidies (i.e. federal assistance in evading waste disposal and decommissioning costs, etc.) we have now entered the twilight of the nuclear era due to the high cost of maintaining unsafe aging nuclear facilities. The deregulation of the energy industry and the widespread availability of energy sources that are now much less expensive than nuclear electricity sound the final death knell of the nuclear power industry.

A third critical component of the loss of economic viability of the nuclear power industry is the recent turn of events prompted by whistleblower revelations which have resulted in a more intense NRC scrutiny of inadequacies and design defects in existing safety systems. The reevaluation of the safety systems not only at MYAPC, but at other NRC supervised facilities has resulted in a series of plant closures and a cascade of repair bills. The economic impact of updating plant equipment and replacing defective safety systems is of sufficient significance in and of itself to render the nuclear industry at a competitive disadvantage even without the loss of regulatory protection, government subsidies, Cold War coattail patronage or FERC loopholes. Upgrading unsafe reactors is an extremely costly proposition.

In the twilight of the nuclear era, we can look back at the historical events which lead to the development of this industry. The generation of nuclear electricity is an unfortunate footnote to the development of nuclear weapons. In the post Chernobyl era, society is becoming much more aware of the risks and costs of this technological dinosaur. The public relations efforts necessary to insure popular support for technology based upon government subsidies and a ritual of evasion of waste disposal and decommissioning costs are no longer sufficient to counter the obvious safety hazards and the looming deficits of this technology. The sales to waste production ratio for MYAPC and other nuclear power plants is $20 in revenues for every curie of spent fuel wastes generated. All nuclear power plants generate nuclear wastes at the rate of about 1,000 curies per hour of operation for a typical 800-900 megawatt facility. No country has yet come up with a safe solution for disposing of these spent fuel wastes including the construction and actual implementation of a final safe permanent geological repository. The propensity of certain countries (England, France, Japan, Germany, etc.) to reprocess spent fuel is an unsatisfactory solution that only results in the production of additional huge quantities of radioactive waste and the creation and proliferation of even more fissile material (plutonium). The legacy of the generation of nuclear power, assuming there are no further catastrophic nuclear accidents, is thus:

• 1. The long term economic burden of the safe storage or disposal of these wastes will be a legacy of the twentieth century for generations to come. Due to both cost and political considerations, the prospect of final disposal of radioactive wastes in a geological repository is probably a chimera. The more realistic alternative is monitored retrievable portable stored waste. This option is a safer but also a much more expensive alternative to the uncontained release of radioactive waste in geological formations as has been the past practice in the United States and which continues to be the policy in all other countries with a nuclear generating capacity.
• 2. A second component of this legacy is the long term burden of insuring that the nuclear generation of electricity, in itself essentially a small nuclear accident occurring over a long release duration at each generating station, doesn't evolve into a larger Chernobyl type accident. Society may succeed at containing the radioactivity at each nuclear power station and limiting the effluents to a few curies of biologically significant radionuclides, but only at a huge cost to future generations.
• 3. The third component of the nuclear energy pyramid is the long term burden of management of reactor grade plutonium. The presence of substantial quantities of ²³⁹Pu (1/2 T = 24,240 yr.) in MYAPC spent fuel means this material must be the subject of extensive security precautions for thousands of years. These costly security precautions must ensure that this plutonium is not available to persons or governments who would extract it for weapons production purposes, or utilize the spent fuel in a raw form as a component of terrorist or nuclear blackmail activities.

The recent glare of publicity on the deficiencies and inadequacies of existing nuclear power plant safety systems and the urgent necessity for their immediate and costly repair and upgrading only exacerbates the economic pressures which are now undermining the viability of nuclear energy. The decommissioning waste inventories, scenarios and plant site use options of the future are unpleasant components of the economic unraveling of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme in Maine.
 

B. DECOMMISSIONING WASTE INVENTORIES

The following is an approximate estimate of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company radioactive wastes at shutdown (2008); it is these wastes that are our site-specific legacy to the generations who will follow us in Maine: ¹
 

Pre-decommissioning Low-level Waste: Stage I (to 2008)	12,000 curies
Decommissioning-derived Low-level Waste: Stage II (2008)	129,295 curies
GTCCW: in Reactor Vessel: (2010*)	4,047,879 curies
HLW: Spent Fuel: (2008)	341,000,000 curies***
Short-lived nuclides at shutdown: (2008)	150,000,000 curies
Montsweag Bay: (2008)**	<10,000 curies
Terrestrial environment: (2008)	<10,000 curies

*After two years of cooling
**The actual nuclide inventory of Montsweag Bay is difficult to characterize due to the unknown impact of the leaky fuel cladding in the early years of MYAPC operation, which may have resulted in substantially more liquid effluent releases than MYAPC documentation notes. Another anomaly in regard to MYAPC environmental monitoring occurred in 1978 when W.J. McCarthy was monitoring radionuclide concentrations in Maine Yankee seaweed. At the time he was taking samples from Montsweag Bay, a Chinese nuclear test explosion was noted and several weeks later McCarthy observed substantial contamination in Montsweag Bay sea vegetables resulting from this test. MYAPC's radiological surveillance, the laboratory analysis of which was done by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (See whistleblower's letter in the previous sub-section of this part of RADNET), was unable to observe either the radioiodine contamination pulse or the barium 140, lanthanum 140 and ruthenium 103 that McCarthy observed. The following table summarizes the discrepancies in McCarthy's vs. MYAPC's surveillance. 
***The recent startup of a Tennessee nuclear power station (TVA) slightly lowers this estimate, which is derived from dividing the projected spent fuel inventory in 2008 by the number of light water reactors (LWR).

¹This table adapted from Brack (1993), pg. 17.

²Adapted from Brack (1986), pg. 25.
³Highest in Montsweag Bay report.
⁴Highest range in annual report; seaweed species not specified.
⁵LLD: Contamination below the lower limit of detection.

NRC rules for decommissioning nuclear facilities allow three possible methods for plant deconstruction and waste storage and removal.
 

The prompt removal (within six to eight years) of all plant equipment and radioactive wastes and the return of the plant site to unrestricted use. The 1987 TLG report which estimated prompt decommissioning costs at $187,000,000 is now completely obsolete. Total decommissioning costs using the DECON scenario would exceed $2,000,000,000 and would include:

• The removal of contaminated plant low-level waste components and their disposal in a Texas low-level waste repository: $400,000,000+.
• The removal of uncontaminated or very slightly contaminated plant equipment and debris to an unknown location and the return of the site to unrestricted use: $100,000,000+/-.
• General decommissioning costs, including staff termination and administrative costs: $500,000,000+.
• The removal of GTCC reactor vessel wastes and their packaging within a multiple purpose canister (MPC*) system and their transport to an unknown location: $100,000,000+.
• The removal of spent fuel and its packaging within a multiple purpose canister system (MPC*) and its temporary containment in a monitored retrievable storage site (MRS) prior to a final disposal at Yucca Mountain including temporary maintenance of the existing spent fuel pool, extensive ongoing administrative costs, and MRS site preparation obligations: $200,000,000+.
• Final disposal of spent fuel at Yucca Mountain including site evaluation, construction and administrative costs for at least fifty years: $900,000,000+.

*The multiple purpose canister (MPC) system includes canisters for the spent fuel, storage casks, transportation casks and disposal casks for the spent fuel canisters, horizontal storage facilities for monitored retrievable storage (MRS) and specially designed rail and transport vehicles.

**Not to be confused with the general decommissioning fund for MYAPC, which now stands at $125,000,000.
 

SAFESTOR is the decommissioning technique recommended by the most recent TLG report, which now estimates decommissioning costs at $316,622,600. The SAFESTOR scenario involves long-term on site mothballing of MYAPC until the always elusive final high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain is available. SAFESTOR implies a final dismantling at some future date; all costs are either postponed or exacerbated. The only advantage to SAFESTOR is the political convenience of delaying the inevitable decommissioning shortfall for collection by future generations.
 

MYAPC DECOMMISSIONING CONUNDRUM The Hanford Reservation in Washington state has a January, 1, 1995, inventory of 348,000,000 Ci of contained high-level waste and total site life cycle remediation cost estimate of 75 billion dollars, reduced to 50 billion dollars in 1996 due to budget cutbacks. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has an inventory of 51.6 million Ci of contained high-level waste and total site life cycle remediation cost estimate of 30 billion dollars, reduced to 19 billion dollars in 1996 due to budget cutbacks. The MYAPC inventory of contained spent fuel wastes at 10 years cooling is approximately 200 million Ci. No mention is made by NRC or state of Maine officials of any "site life cycle remediation cost estimates." THE MYAPC PYRAMID SCHEME: NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY @ 2.7 CENTS PER KILOWATT HOUR AND ... ?

The one decommissioning option never mentioned by the NRC and the licensee, entombment is the likely decommissioning scenario of the future due to the high costs and political difficulties of off-site waste disposal. This option is clearly defined in NRC regulations. Recent NRC rule changes allow transfer of oversight responsibilities for "decommissioned reactors" to a committee of concerned citizens, e.g. environmentalists. Environmental radiation levels must be maintained at 15 µR^-1. Establishment of an ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) at the time of decommissioning is permitted by the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act which includes a lengthy passage defining ISFSI regulations. One of many possible decommissioning scenarios would allow the Lincoln County Planning Commission, as administrator of both in-state and out-of-state vendor sponsored reactor and spent fuel wastes, to supplement the Wiscasset ISFSI costs with revenue enhancement from storing additional spent fuel generated courtesy of the South Korean Lightwater Reactor Agreement (Dec. 1995). The South Koreans are just one of many foreign and domestic waste generators seeking ISFS facilities within the U.S. as a result of waste disposal obligations inherent in both domestic and foreign DOE contract arrangements. If this seems a remote possibility, consider the 28 tons of foreign spent fuel now returning to the Savannah River Plant for reprocessing as a component of DOE contract agreements which are being observed. These DOE contract-derived wastes are just the tip of the iceberg of nuclear wastes looking for temporary storage facilities or waiting for reprocessing. If Maine's newly elected independent governor would be faithful to his devotion to favoring the interests of the most predatory commercial activities in a world of Darwinian corporate struggle-for-survival, why would the defacto high-level waste dump at Wiscasset not be expanded to meet the challenge of servicing the nuclear industry the state government so enthusiastically adulates? Monitored retrievable storage of foreign spent fuel has the potential to be an extremely lucrative business, and the MYAPC site has a very convenient location adjacent to an accessible deep water bay. Aerial surveillance reveals two excellent near-site locations for an ISFS facility near Wiscasset: Chewonki Neck and the "north-side parcel," either or both of which would provide a convenient location for a semi-permanent or permanent well-landscaped sculpture garden of interesting dry cask storage containers of one design or another. Under any conditions, the likely scenario for MYAPC generated spent fuel is not monitored retrievable storage in Nevada as proposed by current legislation proposed in Congress (Feb. 1997). When it comes to nuclear waste, what looks great on paper is usually extremely difficult to implement for political and economic reasons. The more likely scenario is the devolution of waste storage responsibilities to the local level; this is both more consistent with current government deregulation efforts and also much cheaper to fund. The town of Wiscasset is not only a principal beneficiary of the generation of nuclear electricity, but the likely location of MYAPC ratepayer entitlements, i.e. spent fuel waste. The tip off that MYAPC derived spent fuel will be difficult to move is the current failure not only to fund, design and construct the multipurpose canister system necessary to move the fuel, but to publicly discuss the issue and the many relevant unfunded decommissioning obligations. In Maine, the denial mechanisms of a predatory state government have been very effective at postponing the day of reckoning. Recent developments at MYAPC clearly indicate that the sophisticated public relations efforts essential to the continued operation of MYAPC pyramid scheme (public relations - the governor's greatest forte) are grossly inadequate to postpone the twilight of the nuclear era in Maine.
 

MPC UPDATE: Recent budget cutbacks at the OCRWM (Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management) have resulted in the termination of the DOE program for designing a modern multipurpose canister system. The MPC system was to be used at all nuclear facilities for on-site monitored retrievable storage of spent fuel, or its transport to either a temporary or permanent repository. Any NRC licensee seeking to utilize MPC technology in the future will have to obtain this equipment from the private sector. The lack of a uniform design and the involvement of for-profit corporations in the future design and construction of this equipment will result in greatly increased costs for utilities choosing to use this technology. The rationalization for the termination of this program may be that there is no sense in wasting tax dollars if there is no certain destiny for spent fuel (e.g. Yucca Mountain). One immediate effect of the cancellation of the MPC program is to promote reliance on the much more primitive dry cask technology for spent fuel storage. This older technology utilizes cement casks which are not portable and have a much more limited life expectancy than the modern MPC system; use of dry casks implies the spent fuel will not be going anywhere. Dry cask storage has one advantage over an MPC system: it is much less expensive. This is one more component of the collapse of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme.

Brack, H.G. (Ed.). (1993). Legacy for our children: The unfunded costs of decommissioning the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. Pennywheel Press, Hulls Cove, ME.

• This report describes the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company as a model for the dilemmas of dismantling any nuclear power facility.
• This report reproduces the MYAPC reactor vessel nuclide inventory which was included in the 1987 TLG Decommissioning Study for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, and then reprinted in Vanags (1992, A Study in Radioactive Wastes). This data, essential in evaluating the efficacy of NRC decommissioning alternatives, is otherwise not available from the NRC or the licensee.
• This report also contains approximate estimates of the unfunded decommissioning costs pertaining to MYAPC which are in excess of $1,000,000,000.

Jackson, Shirley A. (April 29, 1997). Testimony April 29, 1997, Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the House Commerce Committee, Energy and Power Subcommittee concerning high-level waste legislation. Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.

• "We believe the provision in H.R. 1270 for centralized interim storage of spent fuel has several positive features. Continued at-reactor storage, for an interim period, would protect public health and safety. However, a centralized interim storage facility, when compared to dispersed storage at more than 75 sites throughout the country, would allow for a more focused inspection and surveillance program by both the Department of Energy and the NRC. In addition, such a facility would save valuable inspection resources for permanently shut-down facilities..."
• "Indefinite storage in an above-ground facility is inconsistent with the Commission's Waste Confidence decision ... The Commission ... strongly supports including in H.R. 1270 deep geologic disposal as an essential element of an integrated system. The Commission continues to believe that deep geologic disposal is a sound and technically feasible solution to the problem of final disposition of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes."
• "... the NRC can maintain its technical capabilities for licensing deep geologic disposal contingent on adequate funding for the NRC high-level waste program."
• "The NRC is concerned that the overall schedule which provides for the Department of Energy's acceptance of high-level nuclear waste for interim storage no later than January 31, 2000, and its submission of the license application for the permanent repository no later than December 31, 2002, sets these programs on a collision course with respect to a need for resources, if adequate funding is not provided for both of these fundamental elements of the integrated high-level nuclear waste management system."
• "We agree with provisions in H.R. 1270 which revoke the Department of Energy's repository siting guidelines. ... Further, the bill should make clear that amendments to the Commission's regulations to implement the Act shall not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement or an environmental review under NEPA."
• "Timely NRC review of a potential repository license application will depend on, among other things, receipt of a high-quality license application from the Department of Energy, as well as on sufficient NRC resources to maintain its independent technical review capability."
• Chair Jackson also expressed concern that H.R. 1270 "would require the Commission to license phase one facilities within 16 months of receipt of an application." Jackson expressed (the optimistic) view that "2 to 3 years may be necessary."
• This testimony references ongoing and in fact growing concern with decommissioning and waste storage disposal funding shortfalls. The DOE's most recent estimate of the cost of construction and implementation of the Yucca Mountain geological repository is $26,550,000,000 excluding defense and West Valley high-level waste disposal. Under the ideal circumstance that reactor performance will not be affected by aging, the DOE estimates that this amount is sufficient to implement the geological repository (DOE/RW-0490, October 1996: see the review of this citation in this section of RADNET). The editor of RADNET respectfully submits the opinion that life cycle costs for siting all commercial spent fuel including extensive administrative costs not included in DOE estimates, but excluding multi-purpose canister costs included in the 1996 DOE report but recently cut by Congress, are now approaching 100 billion dollars for 109 nuclear power plants.
• Chair Jackson references but does not specify that the construction and implementation of an interim off-site monitored retrievable storage facility in Nevada as a component of the integrated high-level nuclear waste management system will add an additional cost of at least 100 million dollars to the final total cost.
• Jackson also neglects to mention that resumption of the multiple purpose canister program essential to the efficient and safe storage of spent fuel or transportation to any location will cost approximately 65 to 75 million dollars per power plant for the canisters themselves, with tens of millions of dollars in additional administrative, transportation, legal and insurance costs necessary to get the MPC's to the interim storage site in Nevada.
• Total system life cycle costs for the integrated high-level nuclear waste management system including deep geological disposal in 1997 dollars are at least one billion dollars per NRC licensed nuclear facility. The testimony of chair Jackson before the House Commerce Committee, Energy and Power Subcommittee references this conundrum without being cost specific. The rapidly increasing costs of low-level, GTCC and high-level waste management as well as the growing costs of plant decommissioning and NRC mandated safety upgrades are simply not matched by a likely availability of sufficient federal funds (as well as ratepayers contributions) to finance the utopian vision of a happy ending to the nuclear energy debacle.

• This brief report provides an interesting glimpse into some of the assumptions underlying the nuclear waste scam at the MYAPC.
• The five year (1987-1991) average cost of MYAPC's electricity is given as 2.9 cents a kilowatt hour... "without the electricity from MYAPC, electricity consumers in Maine would spend 65-100 million dollars more for electricity." (pg. 1).
• This data is followed by the information that under federal law disposal of high-level waste (spent fuel) "is the responsibility of the federal government whereas low-level waste disposal is a state responsibility " (pg. 1).
• Nowhere in this report is it mentioned that, in fact, the federal government accepts responsibility for spent fuel disposal only upon its receipt at a final geological repository and only if such a repository is available. Otherwise, all storage, maintenance, packaging, transportation and temporary monitored retrievable storage costs for spent fuel are the responsibility of MYAPC ratepayers as the principle beneficiaries of the generation of electricity derived from this facility.
• This report discusses spent fuel storage options, of which re-racking was the choice that has been implemented since its publication.
• No mention is made of the myriad problems associated with long-term storage of spent fuel in an environment that was not designed for this purpose.

• This publication discusses licensee hopes for an off site low-level waste disposal scenario in preference to on site low-level waste disposal.

Malestskos, C.J. (1989). Radioactivities in the cycle of a potential low-level radioactive waste repository in Maine: A report to the Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority. Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority, Augusta, ME.

• This report, which discusses the relatively small amounts of operational low-level wastes originating from MYAPC, is significant in that it is a symbol of state and licensee focus on the least significant component of waste production at MYAPC. No mention is made of decommissioning derived low-level wastes, reactor vessel GTCC wastes or spent fuel wastes, all of which must be funded for storage and disposal by ratepayer collections which have yet to be instituted on any significant level.

• This data base (1982 edition) was first reviewed by the Center for Biological Monitoring (Brack, 1986), and provides the inventories of spent fuel in lightwater reactors in the United States used throughout RADNET.

• See RAD 11-5: United States Military Source Points for an extensive discussion of the significance of high-level waste and spent fuel inventories contained in this most recent issue of this data base.

• This is the first of the decommissioning reports which estimated decommissioning costs at MYAPC at $167,000,000 and resulted in the 1994 report by the Center for Biological Monitoring on the decommissioning deficit at MYAPC which has yet to be funded.
• This link will show you a printable scan of the reactor vessel inventory page from this report.
• Our comments on this report can be found in the Decommissioning Debacle section.

• This is the most recent decommissioning report and contains an estimate of $316,000,000 for the DECON scenario, with a slightly higher estimate for the SAFESTOR alternative.
• This report contains the first discussion of the possibility that decommissioning MYAPC may be delayed due to a lack of a site for disposing of spent fuel wastes.
• "It is currently anticipated that MYAPC will need to provide for extended storage and caretaking of the spent fuel inventory until such time that off site disposal becomes an option." (pg. 15).
• This latest TLG report is contained within the Amendment to FPC Rate Schedule No. 1, Vol. 1 (United States of America before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. ER94-___; Jan. 18, 1994).

• These requirements are explicit and specify that radioactive wastes must be funded for their storage and disposal at the time they are generated.
• This is the source of the NRC decommissioning scenarios which include DECON, SAFESTOR (the current decommissioning plan for MYAPC as designated in the latest TLG decommissioning report), and the one option never mentioned but the most likely future scenario, ENTOMBMENT.
• These general requirements are the subject for a special Center for Biological Monitoring report to the Office of the Attorney General, State of Maine; the NRC has failed to observe or enforce its own decommissioning requirements. To order a full copy of this CBM report, see RAD 16-2: Publications list.

• This report pertains to the radionuclide inventories which will result from the decommissioning of MYAPC. The primary focus of this report is on the 129,000 curies of low-level waste which will be generated by the deconstruction of this facility (See the revised edition of this report; the first edition of this report contained incorrect data).
• The estimate of the burial volume of low-level waste is given as 443,939 ft³; this estimate has since been sharply lowered due to developments in compaction technology, as noted in the second TLG decommissioning report.
• This report reprints information about the MYAPC reactor vessel and components, including greater than class C (GTCC) waste inventories of over 4,000,000 Ci, which cannot be sited in the Texas compact low-level waste repository now under construction.
• See Brack (1994) for an extensive discussion of the contents of this report. The Center for Biological Monitoring report which contains this discussion can be ordered, for information go to RAD 16: Publications List.
• At the time of publication, this report represented a step in the direction of freedom of information (FOI) about nuclear waste, as appendix 4 was the first listing of reactor vessel components and wastes of an NRC sponsored reactor that this editor has seen. Following this slip-up, security has been tightened and no subsequent licensee generated radioactive waste information (TLG was the subcontractor providing the decommissioning study) has appeared in any state of Maine reports. In fact, such reports have been discontinued under the administration of an Independent governor who this editor sees as an integral contributor to the predatory milieu of evasion of nuclear waste funding and power up-rate scams at MYAPC.
• Recent safety evaluations by the Maine Nuclear Safety Advisor indicate that aging steam generators subject to multiple micro-degradation mechanisms, when resleeved with state of the art technology are of equal or superior safety to new steam generators. However, only a small component of the aging parent tubes have been repaired, giving rise to radical differences in service life expectancy. This raises the question as to whether Mr. Vanags is still the State Nuclear Safety Advisor, or has his job description been changed to that of public relations advocate for the licensee, MYAPC?
• The failure to admit the priority of licensee economic interests over the safety evaluations of aging steam generators and other equipment or note the multiplicity of safety and design flaws revealed by recent NRC inspections, combined with the enthusiastic support of the Maine state government for the nuclear energy waste pyramid scheme, suggests that the office of Maine Nuclear Safety Advisor (SNSA) is an unlikely source of accurate nuclear safety information, now, or in any time in the future. As the MYAPC nears the end of its operational activities, the reactionary role of the SNSA in recent safety controversies effectively renders this office as an obsolete but symbolic component of the collapse of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme.

Two fundamental groups of legal issues confront the MYAPC and its sponsors, supporters, and ratepayers in the twilight of the nuclear era, a twilight which the MYAPC both characterizes and nourishes. The most pressing and obvious legal issues pertain to the questions raised by the whistleblower's letter, investigated by the NRC, and now pending before the office of the U.S. Attorney for Maine, U.S. Dept. of Justice: did MYAPC and YAEC (and possibly some officials at the NRC) deliberately and fraudulently manipulate computer data for the purposes of misrepresenting the capacities of the emergency core cooling system and the reactor vessel containment for the purpose of obtaining (three) illegal power up-rates? These power up-rates resulted in a windfall to the corporate sponsors of MYAPC of +/-100 million dollars. To what extent did MYAPC and YAEC employees violate NRC regulations, federal laws, or engage in a conspiracy for the purpose of profit? To put the question in a slightly different way, did these employees and corporate sponsors engage in a pattern of criminal activity which would justify prosecution under U.S. Code Title 18 Sections 1961-1968 (Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act)? Most of the following citations and reports deal with this first group of legal issues.

The second fundamental legal issue confronting the MYAPC and its sponsors, supporters and ratepayers also relates to violation of NRC regulations and federal law. The 1981 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities (Fed. Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988) clearly mandate funding nuclear waste storage, transportation and disposal costs at the time of the generation of the radioactive wastes. Who is responsible for the failure to comply with these federal regulations? Why does the NRC, as well as the federal government not enforce its own regulations and laws? Who was responsible for this failure and who profits as a result of this enforcement failure? What is the relationship between this group of legal issues and the huge profits which result from this funding failure, and the first group of legal issues pertaining to falsification of computed data and the huge profits that derived from these illegal activities? A second component of the legal issues arising from the failure to fund the storage and disposal of MYAPC radioactive wastes relates to the role of the State of Maine and its long-time support of the evasion of these inevitable costs. What role has the offices of Governor, Public (corruption) Advocate, State Planning Office, Human Services and State Nuclear Safety Advisor played in the evasion of these costs, and what is their responsibility for the huge waste disposal and decommissioning deficits, the future payment of which is the legal obligation of Maine's electrical utility ratepayers? The following citations and reports pertain to either one or both of these groups of legal issues.
 

B. LEGAL ISSUES BIBLIOGRAPHY

Center for Biological Monitoring. (1993). The failure to fund nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station: A commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities. Fed Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988. Prepared for the Office of Attorney General, Augusta, Maine.

• This is the first in a series of reports prepared by the Center for Biological Monitoring pertaining to the violations of federal law with respect to funding radioactive waste storage and disposal costs. This report was also sent to the U.S. Dept. of Justice. Both the State Attorney General and the U.S. Dept. of Justice apparently disposed of all CBM reports in the nearest circular file.
• This report is available upon request in writing from the Center for Biological Monitoring.

• This report was prepared specifically for the U.S. Dept. of Justice following a Sept. 11, 1993, complaint about irregularities in the operation and oversight of the MYAPC.
• This report applies the contents of the previous complaint to specific defendants: MYAPC, NRC, FERC, USDOE, and certain officials of the State of Maine, and includes a total of 31 complaints pertaining to the failure to fund nuclear wastes storage and disposal costs.
• This report is available upon request in writing from the Center for Biological Monitoring.

• The seven principles of administering (the collapse of the) MYAPC (nuclear waste pyramid scheme):
1. "Instill personal ownership/accountability in each employee"
2. "Ensure staff competence"
3. "Follow procedures"
4. "Operate conservatively"
5. "Be self-critical"
6. "Maintain equipment in top shape"
7. "Run effective, safe, short outages"
• ... and hope this will be sufficient to offset the dangers and risks of an aging nuclear power station.
• Too many dikes, not enough fingers.

• This report contains an important point about federal preemption "which in some critical areas removes state officials from direct jurisdiction over or perhaps even knowledge of safety matters" (pg. 30).
• A frightening example of state complicity in the traffic in nuclear waste.
• This report notes that a mandatory early shut down of MYAPC will result in the necessity of MYAPC ratepayers and Maine taxpayers reimbursing MYAPC owners 1.2 billion dollars in compensation for lost investment.
• This report conveniently fails to note that MYAPC generates 1 curie of high-level waste for every $20 in electricity sales and that unfunded decommissioning and waste storage and transportation costs are in excess of the 1.2 billion dollars which would be necessary to pay the MYAPC owners in case of a mandatory early shutdown of the MYAPC nuclear waste pyramid scheme.

U. S. Department of Energy. (October 1996). Nuclear waste fund fee adequacy: An assessment. DOE/RW-0490. U.S. DOE, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Washington, D.C.

• "The purpose of this report is to present the Departments analysis of the adequacy of the 1.0 mil per kWh fee being paid by the nuclear utilities for the permanent disposal of their SNF [spent nuclear fuel]." (pg. 1).
• "The evaluation of fee adequacy is based on the principle of 'full cost recovery' set forth in section 302 of the NWPA [Nuclear Waste Policy Act], under which all costs related to the waste disposal services will be paid for by the owners and generators of SNF and civilian and defense high-level radioactive waste." (pg. 5).
• "It is assumed in this projection that commercial units will operate for 40 years from the issuance of their operating licenses without extensions, reactor performance will not be affected by aging, and the equilibrium-cycle capacity factor will increase slightly from 74 percent in 1995 through 2014 to between 75 and 76 percent until 2034. The operable nuclear capacity has currently peaked at 100.3 gigawatts (GW) and is projected to gradually decrease to 62.2 GW in 2015 and reach zero in 2035. ... Cumulative discharge of civilian spent fuel is estimated to be about 84,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU) SNF." (pg. 5-6).
• "If the disposal fee remains unchanged at 1.0 mil per kWh of electricity generated and sold, the cumulative fee revenues will be equivalent to $19.4 billion in 1994 dollars, comprised of annual disposal fees, on-time fees, and interest accrued on deferred one-time fees. Annual disposal fee payments total $15.4 billion (in 1994 dollars) from FY 1983 to FY 2034 ($9.4 billion for FY 1995 through FY 2034) under the no-new-orders scenario." (pg. 7).
• "The utilities originally owed approximately $2.3 billion in year of expenditure dollars in one-time fees to the NWF [Nuclear Waste Fund] for the disposal of the waste generated prior to April 7, 1983. At the end of FY 1994, $1.5B of principal and interest had been paid, and $880M of principal remains deferred and is accruing interest at the 13 week T-bill rate." (pg. 7).
• "Interest on unexpended NWF balances provides revenue in addition to the fees and interest on deferred one-time payments discussed above. NWF balances are invested by the Secretary of the Treasury in obligations of the United States with maturities appropriate to the needs of the program." (pg. 7).
• "Estimated total system life-cycle costs are organized into seven major categories: (1) Development and Evaluation, (2) Repository, (3) Transportation, (4) Multi-Purpose Canister, (5) Waste Acceptance, (6) Benefits, and (7) Payments Equivalent to Taxes (PETT). ... Program costs are expected to peak in 2009 and gradually decrease until 2071, with a cumulative total of $33,096 million of which the civilian portion is $26,550 million. Also in Table 1 (see below) are the defense and West Valley share allocations of estimated total system cost." (pg. 7-8).

Table 1. Summary of Civilian, Defense, and West Valley Allocations of the Total System Life Cycle costs ⁽¹⁾
(in Millions of 1994 Dollars)

Category	Cost Allocation(2)
	Defense HLW	West Valley HLW	Civilian SNF	Total(3)
Development & Evaluation	2,756	46	9,717	$12,520
Repository	2,817	47	7,932	$10,796
Transportation	434	10	1,846	$2,290
MPC	0	3	5,516	$5,519
Waste Acceptance	236	5	1,005	$1,246
Benefits	109	2	306	$417
PETT	80	1	226	$308
Total (3)	$6,432	$114	$26,550	$33,096
Allocation %	19.43%	0.34%	80.22%	100%

⁽¹⁾ Based on Analysis of Total System Life Cycle Costs, September 1995 (Reference 6)
⁽²⁾ Based on the Federal Register, Volume 52, Number 161, pp 31508-31524, August 20, 1987.
⁽³⁾ Totals may not add due to rounding.

United States of America v. Edouard H. Trottier

The United States Attorney Charges:

COUNT ONE:

On or about September 20, 1996, in the District of Maine, the defendant,

EDOUARD H. TROTTIER

an officer and employee of the United States and of a department and agency thereof, to wit, a Project Manager in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ('NRC'), published, divulged, disclosed and made known in a manner and to an extent not authorized by law, information coming to him in the course of his employment and official duties and by reason of an examination and investigation made by and a report and record made to and filed with the NRC, which information concerned and related to, among other things, the identity of persons; to wit, defendant

EDOUARD H. TROTTIER

transmitted to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ('Maine Yankee'), a subject of an NRC Office of Investigations ('OI') investigation concerning the alleged deliberate failure of Maine Yankee to comply with NRC requirements regarding the adequacy of Maine Yankee's emergency core cooling system, portions of a confidential OI Investigative Report which contained the allegations and conclusions of the NRC investigation and the identities of certain individuals with information who had been identified in that investigation,

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1905.

Dated: March 13, 1997

___________________
Donald E. Clark
Assistant U.S. Attorney

• This is the NRC order that limited power operation to 2,400 megawatts which resulted from a preliminary investigation of a whistle blower's allegations of fraudulent manipulation of computer data for the purpose of operating at a higher power level (2,700 megawatts).
• "....that Yankee Atomic Electric Company and the Licensee (MYAPC) knowingly performed inadequate analyses of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and the containment to support two license amendments to increase the rated thermal power at which Maine Yankee may operate. It is further alleged that the licensee deliberately misrepresented the analyses to the NRC in seeking the license amendments. Specifically, it is alleged that YAEC management knew that the ECCS for Maine Yankee, if evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 using the RELAP5YA code, did not meet the licensing requirements for either the 2630 MWt or 2700 MWt power up-rates that had previously been granted, and that deliberate misrepresentations were made to the NRC in order to obtain the 2700 Mwt power up-rate." (pg. 1-2).
• "It is also alleged that the licensee had applied for power up-rates on the basis of a fraudulent containment analysis. Specifically, the facility containment was designed for a pressure of 55 psig, but allegedly, YAEC deliberately excluded an energy source (steam generators) from the calculations to conceal the possibility that containment pressure could increase beyond the design pressure during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)." (pg. 2).
• Also see Brief to the U.S. Attorney, Jay McCloskey, Dec. 13, 1995 and Summary Notice for a Petition for Indictment.
• This report can be reviewed at the NRC Public Document Room at the Wiscasset Public Library or ordered from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Docket No. 50-309, TAC No. M94194.

• This is the second of a three part investigation of allegations of manipulation of computer data in regard to "inadequate small break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) analyses of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to support two license amendments to increase the rated thermal power at which Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station could operate." (pg. 3).
• "Specifically, it was alleged that YAEC management knew that the ECCS for Maine Yankee, if evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.46 using the RELAP5YA code, did not meet the licensing requirements for either the 2630 Mwt or the 2700 Mwt power up-rates that had previously been granted and that deliberate misrepresentations were made to the NRC in order to obtain the 2700 Mwt power up-rate. It was further alleged that MYAPC was cognizant of these inadequate analyses, yet misrepresented them to the NRC in seeking the license amendments.... It was also alleged that MYAPC applied for power up-rates on the basis of a fraudulent containment analysis." (pg. 3).
• This report explores the details of NRC staff activities (See pg. 13-19) and the role they played in assisting the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. and the YAEC in obtaining these illegal power up-rates by failing to observe and implement NRC regulations issued after the Three Mile Island accident. This report focuses on the role of the NRC Maine Yankee Project Manager in failing to oversee the implementation of plant specific analysis and its submission to the NRC as a component of upgraded safety evaluation reports (SER), as well as other NRC staff oversight failures which contributed to the ability of the MYAPC and the YAEC to circumvent NRC regulations.
• This report has been issued by NRC Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and can be viewed in the NRC Public Document Room at the Wiscasset Public Library or ordered from the Office of the Inspector General (Case No. 9604S).

• "AUTHORIZATION.--The Secretary shall design, construct, and operate a facility for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at the interim storage facility site." (pg. 27).
• "Within 18 months of a determination by the President that the Yucca Mountain site is unsuitable for development as a repository under subparagraph (B), the President shall designate a site for the construction of an interim storage facility. If the President does not designate a site for the construction of an interim storage facility, or the construction of an interim storage facility at the designated site is not approved by law within 24 months of the President's determination that the Yucca Mountain site is not suitable for development as a repository, the Secretary shall begin construction of an interim storage facility at the interim storage facility site as defined in section 2(19) of this Act." (pg. 29).
• "The Secretary shall consent to an amendment to the contracts to provide for reimbursement to contract holders for transportable storage systems purchased by contract holders if the Secretary determines that it is cost effective to use such transportable storage systems as part of the integrated management system, provided that the Secretary shall not be required to expend any funds to modify contract holders' storage or transport systems or to seek additional regulatory approvals in order to use such systems." (pg. 30-31).
• "The interim storage facility licensed in the first phase shall have a capacity of not more than 15,000 MTU." (pg. 31).
• "GUIDELINES.--The guidelines promulgated by the Secretary and published at 10 CFR part 960 are annulled and revoked and the Secretary shall make no assumptions or conclusions about the licensability of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository by reference to such guidelines." (pg. 39).
• "PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION.--In administering the Integrated Management System, the Secretary shall, to the maximum extent possible, utilize, employ, procure and contract with, the private sector to fulfill the Secretary's obligations and requirements under this Act." (pg. 13).
• "ONE-TIME FEE.--For spent nuclear fuel or solidified high-level radioactive waste derived from spent nuclear fuel, which fuel was used to generate electricity in a civilian nuclear power reactor prior to January 7, 1983, the fee shall be in an amount equivalent to an average charge of 1.0 mill per kilowatt-hour for electricity generated by such spent nuclear fuel, or such solidified high-level waste derived therefrom. Payment of such one-time fee prior to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 shall satisfy the obligation imposed under this paragraph. Any one-time fee paid and collected subsequent to the date of enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 pursuant to the contracts, including any interest due pursuant to such contracts, shall be paid to the Nuclear Waste Fund no later than September 30, 2002." (pg. 61).
• "The person paying the fee under this paragraph to the Secretary shall have no further financial obligation to the Federal Government for the long-term storage and permanent disposal of spent fuel or high-level radioactive waste derived from spent nuclear fuel used to generate electricity in a civilian power reactor prior to January 7, 1983. (pg. 61-62).
• "APPROPRIATION REQUEST.--In addition to any request for an appropriation from the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Secretary shall request annual appropriations from general revenues in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of the management of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from atomic energy defense activities and spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors, as established under subsection (a)." (pg. 69).
• S. 104 overrides the environmental assessment clause of the National Environmental Policy Act, depletes as well as terminates the 1982 Nuclear Waste Fund (the mill rate fund referenced above), and completely eliminates nuclear utility financial liability for spent fuel storage and disposal costs.
• S. 104 is the attempt of the nuclear waste industry to effect a massive transfer of financial responsibility from the local level (ratepayers) to the federal level. Federal taxpayers, including those in states without "benefit" of the "entitlements" from nuclear energy generation, would bear the entire burden of spent fuel disposal costs of the future - a very liberal arrangement indeed.
• S. 104, to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, another chapter in the nuclear waste soap opera, provides the obscene spectacle of conservative Republicans from nuclear energy producing states uniting in an unethical attempt to relieve nuclear waste generators of spent fuel storage and disposal responsibilities for the purpose of insuring the continuation of the nuclear waste pyramid scheme. In all probability, the "monitored retrievable" spent fuel disposal site in the Nevada desert would evolve into a permanent defacto spent fuel disposal area since the termination of the Nuclear Waste Fund established in 1982 would insure that insufficient funds would be available to construct a permanent geological repository in the future.
• It is extremely unlikely that S. 104 could ever be implemented were it to be approved by the House of Representatives and were a presidential veto to be overridden by both houses of congress. The recent termination of the multi-purpose canister (MPC) by the Department of Energy is one of several tip-offs indicating the difficulty of actually implementing S. 104.

BRIEF

December 13, 1995

The Citizens of Maine
vs.
The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
The Yankee Atomic Electric Company
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

A Petition to Jay McCloskey, United States Attorney for Maine, requesting the investigation and prosecution of various criminal acts which have had and will have an injurious effect on the constitutional rights and the public safety of the citizens of Maine.


An expansion of the original complaint to the Department of Justice, 1993. NRC Docket No. 50-309 (File RI-91-A-0154).

Prepared by the Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc. for the United States Attorney for Maine and the Maine Attorney General.

Criminal activities requiring the immediate
attention of the Department of Justice,
the United States Attorney for Maine,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Attorney
General for the State of Maine
.

1. The doctoring of computer calculations at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company for the purpose of illegally increasing the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company power level ratings.

In effect, a conspiracy to profit from the illegal additional generation of nuclear electricity via criminal acts which include the violation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and federal law.

2. The criminal misrepresentation of the emergency core cooling system capabilities at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company nuclear reactor by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

In effect, the felonious manipulation of data for the purpose of profiting from an illegal activity which violates NRC regulation and federal law.

3. The falsification of data pertaining to the maximum permissible reactor vessel containment pressure ratings at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

In effect, a conspiracy to profit from illegal activities which are a violation of NRC regulations and federal law, and which could have a catastrophic impact on public safety in Maine.

4. The creation of a clear and present danger to the public safety from an inaccurately rated emergency core cooling system (ECCS) at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.

In effect, increasing the risk to the public safety of a serious nuclear accident resulting from for-profit criminal activities which are a violation of NRC regulations and federal law.

5. The creation of a clear and present danger to the public safety by the return to service of unsafe, corroded, and dilapidated steam generators at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.

In effect, a conspiracy to profit from a clear breech of duty potentially injurious to the public safety in lieu of replacement of the dilapidated steam generators with new equipment.

6. The failure to fund the timely collection of radioactive waste storage, transportation, and disposal costs at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.

In effect, the unconstitutional denial of due process manifested in compulsory future payment of radioactive waste storage, transportation, and disposal costs by Maine citizens who are not the beneficiaries of the generation of these wastes.

7. The failure to maintain an adequate environmental and biological monitoring database in the vicinity of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's nuclear reactor.

In effect, a breech of duty to maintain a sufficient database for interpreting the health effects and environmental impact of normal reactor operations, a nuclear accident, decommissioning, or to allow a return of the facility to unrestricted use after decommissioning.

8. The failure to upgrade current emergency planning in view of the increased risks of ECCS failure, steam tube rupture, and/or reactor vessel failure from embrittlement and/or over pressurization at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.

In effect, a gross breech of duty with the potential for widespread injurious effect to the public safety in the State of Maine.

In general, two categories of criminal activities are the subject of this petition to the U.S. Attorney for Maine and to the Attorney General of the State of Maine.

• For-profit criminal acts consisting of fraudulent manipulation and misrepresentation of data essential to the licensing requirements of the NRC and to the safe operation of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's nuclear reactor.
• The negligent and generic non-compliance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with existing federal law and the NRC's own regulations allowing systemic victimization of unwitting Maine citizens due to the unconstitutional deferral of the collection of radioactive waste storage, transportation, and disposal costs.
SUMMARY A variety of criminal activities can now be documented pertaining to the proposed return to service of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company nuclear reactor. Recent revelations (see reference 1) regarding the plant power ratings, emergency core cooling system (ECCS), and the reactor vessel containment capabilities illuminate a pattern of criminal activity going back over a decade in time. The controversy over the generic non-compliance with NRC regulations and federal law goes back to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. All the activities described in this brief are now of immediate interest as a threat to the public safety and the public finance in Maine at this critical moment of reactor restart.
• a conspiracy to profit from the criminal avoidance of NRC licensing and safety regulations through the extraordinary falsification and misrepresentation of data essential to the safe operation of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and the reactor vessel containment structure
• a conspiracy to profit from the clear and present danger posed by the return of damaged and corroded steam generators to service as well as inadequacies in the ECCS and the reactor vessel containment structure at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company nuclear reactor
• a conspiracy to profit from the unconstitutional denial of due process to the citizens of Maine by the failure to collect sufficient funds to pay for the storage, transportation, and disposal of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's radioactive waste and the illegal redistribution of these funds as profits for the owners of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and their beneficiaries such as Maine Public Broadcasting Network
• the negligent oversight of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company by the NRC and FERC, which permit a pattern of for-profit interstate criminal activity to occur which affects the public safety in Maine and in other states with similar nuclear electricity generating facilities.
No right of federal preemption gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the right to abridge the constitutional rights of the citizens of Maine by their negligent oversight of the duty to regulate nuclear waste, or their failure to prohibit criminal activity which endangers the public safety by jeopardizing the safe operation of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's nuclear reactor (or any nuclear reactor) or which victimizes the citizens of Maine (or any state).

Prosecution of those who illegally profit from the criminal avoidance of NRC licensing requirements, violation of federal laws, the creation of public safety hazards, and the negligent collection of radioactive waste storage, transportation or disposal costs should be undertaken in accordance with U.S. Code Title 18 Sections 1961-1968 (Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act) as well as any other violations of the U.S. Code which the Department of Justice sees fit to prosecute.

The United States Attorney for Maine is requested to join with the Maine Attorney General and seek assistance from the Department of Justice and begin an aggressive investigation of these criminal activities as soon as possible.

Submitted to Jay McCloskey, U.S. Attorney for Maine, Wednesday December 13, 1995 by H.G. Brack, Director, Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.

This petition is also submitted to Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General for the State of Maine, requesting that he join with the United States Attorney for Maine and seek assistance from the Department of Justice in facilitating prosecution of the criminal acts described in this brief. The Attorney General for the State of Maine is also requested to take immediate action to prevent the reopening of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company nuclear reactor.

BIBLIOGRAPHY, REFERENCES &EVIDENCE:

The following documents should be incorporated into the official record and evidence by their mention herein.
1. Anonymous letter delivered to the Union of Concerned Scientists at the end of November 1995 and provided to Mr. Uldis Vanags, Maine State Nuclear Safety Advisor. 3 pp.
2. Brack, H.G. (ed.). 1986. "A review of radiological surveillance reports of waste effluents in marine pathways at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company at Wiscasset, Maine 1970-1984. An annotated bibliography." Center for Biological Monitoring. Pennywheel Press. Hulls Cove, ME 62 pp.
3. Brack, H.G. (ed.). 1993. Legacy for our children: the unfunded costs of decommissioning the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. Center for Biological Monitoring. Pennywheel Press. Hulls Cove ME 134 pp.
4. Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc. No date. "The failure to fund nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station: A commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities." Hulls Cove, ME 6 pp.
5. Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc. October 1994. "Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Non-compliance Update, Re: The failure to fund nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station: A commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities." Hulls Cove, ME 6 pp.
6. Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc. September 1995. "A Summary of Safety Concerns Re: Maine Yankee-NRC Meeting of September 14, 1995 Steam Generator Sleeving Update." Hulls Cove, ME 16 pp.
7. Douglas, John. May/June 1995. "Solutions for steam generators." EPRI Journal. May/June: 29-35.
8. General Requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities. Federal Register 53-24015 to 24055, 1988.
9. Maine Yankee Power Uprate Application, December 1988.
10. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
11. NUREG 0737
12. RELAP5Y, A computer program for light water reactor system thermal-hydraulic analysis" YAEC 1300P
13. United States Code Title 18 Sections 1961-1968, Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act

This letter to Louis J. Freeh, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tenth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20505 dated December 27, 1995 is restricted information.  A copy of this letter may be obtained from the Center for Biological Monitoring by submitting a written request for a copy with an explanation of why it would be of interest to you (Box 144, Hulls Cove, ME  04644).

Shirley Ann Jackson
Chair of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

January 5, 1996

Dear Chair Jackson:

In regard to the allegations of the criminal falsification of data at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the resulting illegal power up-rate I have the following questions:

Do you intend to seek an impartial (e.g. independent of any ongoing NRC inquiry) investigation of the indictable offenses which have been noted in the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company up-rate scam which includes egregious alterations of documents pertaining to the emergency core cooling system, et cetera?

If you don't wish to seek an outside investigation of the Maine Yankee allegations (e.g. FBI), why not?

If not, why not?

If not, why not?

Yours truly,
 

H.G. Brack
Director, Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.

Mr. H. G. Brack, Director
Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.
P. O. Box 144
Hulls Cove, Maine 04644

Dear Mr. Brack:

I am responding to your letter dated January 5, 1996, regarding the allegation that Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC), acting as agent for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo), knowingly performed inadequate analyses to support two license amendments to increase the rated thermal power at which Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station may operate and that MYAPCo was cognizant of these inadequate analyses, yet misrepresented them to the NRC in seeking the license amendments, which were subsequently granted. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission received the allegation on December 4, 1995.

With respect to the issue of inadequate analyses, the NRC conducted a technical review and evaluation of the circumstances and records surrounding the license amendments to increase the station's rated thermal power. Based on the results of that review and on a transcribed public meeting held with MYAPCo on December 18, 1995, at our headquarters here in Rockville, Maryland, the NRC staff determined that the computer code used by Maine Yankee to demonstrate, in part, compliance with our emergency core cooling system (ECCS) requirements has not been applied in a manner conforming to NRC requirements. Accordingly, the staff considers it unacceptable for the plant to operate at its currently-licensed maximum, thermal power rating of 2700 MWt.

The NRC staff issued a Confirmatory Order and Demand for Information on January 3, 1996, which detail these findings and order station power reduced to 2440 MWt (about 90% of 2700 MWt). The Demand for Information required that MYAPCo, before restarting the plant, complete additional reviews and technical evaluations in support of operating Maine Yankee at 2440 MWt and provide the results to NRC under oath of affirmation. After the information required by the Demand for Information was received by the NRC, MYAPCo restarted the plant on January 11, 1996. Our on-site Resident Inspectors report that the plant is operating satisfactorily at 2440 MWt as of this date.

On January 23 through 25, 1996, an NRC inspection was conducted at the plant and at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company. The inspectors, accompanied by observers from the State of Maine, reviewed MYAPCo's additional technical evaluations and material supporting operation at 2440 MWt. All conditions for plant restart were verified satisfactory with no outstanding technical issues remaining.

The NRC staff plans to hold a public meeting near Maine Yankee to discuss the results of its technical reviews and inspections. This meeting is being planned for March, but we will publish the date, time, and location of the meeting in the local media as soon as it is scheduled.

In response to your questions about investigation of MYAPCo's allegedly misrepresenting information to NRC in seeking license amendments, NRC's Office of Investigations is responsible for investigating false statements made to the NRC, either by licensees or contractors and investigating the allegations of wrongdoing against Maine Yankee and YAEC. The Office of Investigations coordinates with other investigative agencies and refers investigative findings that indicate criminal wrongdoing to the Department of Justice and FBI for further investigation and possible criminal prosecution, as appropriate. Consequently, the NRC would not refer the Maine Yankee and YAEC allegations for an outside investigation until the current OI investigation is completed, and then only as warranted by the investigative findings.

For the same reasons, we are not seeking the assistance of independent counsel in the investigation of allegations of irregularities in NRC's approval of the power uprate for the Maine Yankee plant. The procedures governing the appointment of an independent counsel are set forth in the Ethics in Government Act at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599. The Act gives the Attorney General authority to seek the appointment of an independent counsel only when the conditions of the statute are met. The allegations to which you refer do not satisfy these conditions. The NRC's independent Office of the Inspector General, however, has jurisdiction over allegations of malfeasance by NRC employees and is reviewing the Maine Yankee and YAEC allegations, and any possible staff involvement.

Moreover, prosecution of violations of the Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organization Act are not within the purview of the NRC. As I previously stated above, NRC's Office of Investigations will refer findings of potential criminal wrongdoing to the Department of Justice and FBI for further investigation and criminal prosecution, as appropriate.

If you need additional information or if you have any questions, you may want to contact NRC's Project Manager for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, Mr. Ed Trottier. Mr. Trottier can be reached by telephone at (301) 415-1427.

Sincerely,

Shirley Ann Jackson

F. Summary Notice for a Petition for Indictment, posted on January 9, 1996

1. Failure to fund radioactive storage and disposal costs at the time these wastes were generated is a violation of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations.
2. Mandatory future payment of radioactive waste storage and disposal costs by Maine citizens who did not benefit the nuclear generation of electricity which created these wastes is a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
3. The return to service of corroded steam generators suffering from multiple degradation mechanisms, in lieu of their replacement with new equipment, is an act of criminal negligence.
4. The fraudulent alteration of computer data and emergency core cooling system and reactor vessel proficiency reports is a violation of federal law and NRC license requirements.
5. The illegal power up-rate which resulted from these fraudulent misrepresentations yielded +/- $100,000,000 in what may be the largest case of fraud in the history of Maine.
6. The imminent return to service of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the resumption of the production of 1,000 curies of high-level waste per hour of operation is an illegal act and, in view of the deteriorated condition of the Maine Yankee facilities, constitutes a reckless disregard for public safety.
7. The above acts of malfeasance and negligence join to demonstrate that the commercial activities of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company constitute clear evidence of a lucrative pattern of interstate criminal activity which can and should be prosecuted under the civil and criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. sections 1961 et seq. (R.I.C.O.).
8. The failure to act by the attorney general and the governor of Maine to protect Maine citizens from the predatory impact of these federally sponsored activities constitutes both nonfeasance and a de facto obstruction of the administration of justice.