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The fundamental basis of the MYAPC as well as of any nuclear power plant is the creation of wealth based on the generation of nuclear waste. The essence of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme is the collection of the profits resulting from boiling water using fissile material while avoiding the costs of waste disposal and safe plant operation. Federal law permits, and in fact, encourages, this wasteful process as an unfortunate footnote to the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear technologies which it spawned. Nuclear power would never have evolved as a principal means of generating electricity without politically based government subsidies for the design and construction of nuclear plants and the training of its operators and overseers (especially from the nuclear navy) or without the legal loopholes provided by the incompetence of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) allowing evasion of the costs of waste disposal and decommissioning. These subsidies, once the basis for the growth of the nuclear power industry, no longer serve any useful purpose. The buy now pay later philosophy inherent in these subsidies is now a constituent of the declining viability of this industry.

A second component of the decline of the economic viability of the nuclear power industry is that the current propensity of the federal government to deregulate the electrical power industry undermines any remaining benefit derived from the federal subsidies which have artificially supported the nuclear industry up to the present time. It is not the purpose of RADNET to analyze or document this change in federal policy favoring less government regulation, but the fact remains that even with extensive government subsidies (i.e. federal assistance in evading waste disposal and decommissioning costs, etc.) we have now entered the twilight of the nuclear era due to the high cost of maintaining unsafe aging nuclear facilities. The deregulation of the energy industry and the widespread availability of energy sources that are now much less expensive than nuclear electricity sound the final death knell of the nuclear power industry.

A third critical component of the loss of economic viability of the nuclear power industry is the recent turn of events prompted by whistleblower revelations which have resulted in a more intense NRC scrutiny of inadequacies and design defects in existing safety systems. The reevaluation of the safety systems not only at MYAPC, but at other NRC supervised facilities has resulted in a series of plant closures and a cascade of repair bills. The economic impact of updating plant equipment and replacing defective safety systems is of sufficient significance in and of itself to render the nuclear industry at a competitive disadvantage even without the loss of regulatory protection, government subsidies, Cold War coattail patronage or FERC loopholes. Upgrading unsafe reactors is an extremely costly proposition.

In the twilight of the nuclear era, we can look back at the historical events which lead to the development of this industry. The generation of nuclear electricity is an unfortunate footnote to the development of nuclear weapons. In the post Chernobyl era, society is becoming much more aware of the risks and costs of this technological dinosaur. The public relations efforts necessary to insure popular support for technology based upon government subsidies and a ritual of evasion of waste disposal and decommissioning costs are no longer sufficient to counter the obvious safety hazards and the looming deficits of this technology. The sales to waste production ratio for MYAPC and other nuclear power plants is $20 in revenues for every curie of spent fuel wastes generated. All nuclear power plants generate nuclear wastes at the rate of about 1,000 curies per hour of operation for a typical 800-900 megawatt facility. No country has yet come up with a safe solution for disposing of these spent fuel wastes including the construction and actual implementation of a final safe permanent geological repository. The propensity of certain countries (England, France, Japan, Germany, etc.) to reprocess spent fuel is an unsatisfactory solution that only results in the production of additional huge quantities of radioactive waste and the creation and proliferation of even more fissile material (plutonium). The legacy of the generation of nuclear power, assuming there are no further catastrophic nuclear accidents, is thus:

The legacy of MYAPC as a bioregional source point of anthropogenic radioactivity and of hundreds of other commercial source points throughout the world, is that of a massive drain on the scarce public resources of the future for the purpose of paying for the short-sighted and mercenary activities of the past. Only the potential threat of a terrorist vaporizing a nuclear power plant for political or sectarian reasons surpasses the certainty of the huge waste storage and disposal obligations of the future as the most ominous legacy of the twilight of the nuclear era.

The recent glare of publicity on the deficiencies and inadequacies of existing nuclear power plant safety systems and the urgent necessity for their immediate and costly repair and upgrading only exacerbates the economic pressures which are now undermining the viability of nuclear energy. The decommissioning waste inventories, scenarios and plant site use options of the future are unpleasant components of the economic unraveling of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme in Maine.

The following is an approximate estimate of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company radioactive wastes at shutdown (2008); it is these wastes that are our site-specific legacy to the generations who will follow us in Maine: 1
Pre-decommissioning Low-level Waste: Stage I (to 2008) 12,000 curies
Decommissioning-derived Low-level Waste: Stage II (2008) 129,295 curies
GTCCW: in Reactor Vessel: (2010*) 4,047,879 curies
HLW: Spent Fuel: (2008) 341,000,000 curies***
Short-lived nuclides at shutdown: (2008) 150,000,000 curies
Montsweag Bay: (2008)** <10,000 curies
Terrestrial environment: (2008) <10,000 curies

*After two years of cooling
**The actual nuclide inventory of Montsweag Bay is difficult to characterize due to the unknown impact of the leaky fuel cladding in the early years of MYAPC operation, which may have resulted in substantially more liquid effluent releases than MYAPC documentation notes. Another anomaly in regard to MYAPC environmental monitoring occurred in 1978 when W.J. McCarthy was monitoring radionuclide concentrations in Maine Yankee seaweed. At the time he was taking samples from Montsweag Bay, a Chinese nuclear test explosion was noted and several weeks later McCarthy observed substantial contamination in Montsweag Bay sea vegetables resulting from this test. MYAPC's radiological surveillance, the laboratory analysis of which was done by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (See whistleblower's letter in the previous sub-section of this part of RADNET), was unable to observe either the radioiodine contamination pulse or the barium 140, lanthanum 140 and ruthenium 103 that McCarthy observed. The following table summarizes the discrepancies in McCarthy's vs. MYAPC's surveillance. 
***The recent startup of a Tennessee nuclear power station (TVA) slightly lowers this estimate, which is derived from dividing the projected spent fuel inventory in 2008 by the number of light water reactors (LWR).

1This table adapted from Brack (1993), pg. 17.

Comparison of McCarthy et al.' s and MYAPC Data2
McCarthy (3/5/78)
McCarthy (4/1/78)
Aquatic Vegetation4
Zirconium 95 318.3 dry weight 1,176 dry weight 73 wet weight
Niobium 95 226.8 dry weight 711.3 dry weight 111 wet weight
Barium 140 131.8 dry weight 5,150 dry weight LLD5
Lanthanum 140 LLD 13,330 dry weight LLD
Ruthenium 103 39.49 dry weight 4,649 dry weight 73 wet weight
Tellurium 132 None 2,061 dry weight Not measured 
Iodine 131 44.39 dry weight 9,823 dry weight LLD

2Adapted from Brack (1986), pg. 25.
3Highest in Montsweag Bay report.
4Highest range in annual report; seaweed species not specified.
5LLD: Contamination below the lower limit of detection.


The DOE Integrated DataBase indicates weapons production high-level waste has a total radioactivity and thermal power decrease of 2-4% per year "within storage units to which no new waste has been added" (IDB, pg. 46). Pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel contains approximately 20,000,000 curies per metric ton of heavy metal (spent fuel), decaying to about 1,000 Ci per metric ton after 1,000 years (IDB, pg. 28). The probable impact of the MYAPC as an accident-in-progress is not the health physics impact of this spent fuel, but the economic and social costs of ensuring safe storage and disposal of these wastes. MYAPC: Please don't spill your 250 tons of spent fuel.


NRC rules for decommissioning nuclear facilities allow three possible methods for plant deconstruction and waste storage and removal.


The prompt removal (within six to eight years) of all plant equipment and radioactive wastes and the return of the plant site to unrestricted use. The 1987 TLG report which estimated prompt decommissioning costs at $187,000,000 is now completely obsolete. Total decommissioning costs using the DECON scenario would exceed $2,000,000,000 and would include:

The failure of the DOE to build and operate a final repository for civilian spent fuel, which would be paid for by the federal government from funds collected by utility rate payers (referred to as the "mill rate"),** effectively and efficiently shifts long-term spent fuel storage costs back to the ratepayers who are the alleged beneficiaries of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme. The Utopian vision of the Yucca Mountain disposal facility is no longer viable, and, with only slightly more than $100,000,000 collected from MYAPC customers toward such an elaborate decommissioning scenario, it is extremely unlikely that either the federal government or utility ratepayers will ever have the funds to completely decommission Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. The recent attempt to utilize the spent fuel mill rate waste disposal fund, as articulated in the 1996 and 1997 nuclear waste policy acts, to fund the temporary storage of commercial spent fuel at a proposed Nevada Test Site Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility is one more act in the radioactive waste disposal soap opera. Passage of this revised nuclear waste policy act, which would let NRC licensees off the hook with respect to funding spent fuel storage and transportation costs prior to the arrival of these wastes at a final geological repository, failed in 1996 and has been shelved in 1997 as result of Clinton administration opposition. The failure to agree on, construct and finance a geological repository at Yucca Mountain is the key component ensuring the likelihood that MYAPC spent fuel will remain at Wiscasset indefinitely.

*The multiple purpose canister (MPC) system includes canisters for the spent fuel, storage casks, transportation casks and disposal casks for the spent fuel canisters, horizontal storage facilities for monitored retrievable storage (MRS) and specially designed rail and transport vehicles.

**Not to be confused with the general decommissioning fund for MYAPC, which now stands at $125,000,000.


SAFESTOR is the decommissioning technique recommended by the most recent TLG report, which now estimates decommissioning costs at $316,622,600. The SAFESTOR scenario involves long-term on site mothballing of MYAPC until the always elusive final high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain is available. SAFESTOR implies a final dismantling at some future date; all costs are either postponed or exacerbated. The only advantage to SAFESTOR is the political convenience of delaying the inevitable decommissioning shortfall for collection by future generations.

The Hanford Reservation in Washington state has a January, 1, 1995, inventory of 348,000,000 Ci of contained high-level waste and total site life cycle remediation cost estimate of 75 billion dollars, reduced to 50 billion dollars in 1996 due to budget cutbacks. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has an inventory of 51.6 million Ci of contained high-level waste and total site life cycle remediation cost estimate of 30 billion dollars, reduced to 19 billion dollars in 1996 due to budget cutbacks. The MYAPC inventory of contained spent fuel wastes at 10 years cooling is approximately 200 million Ci. No mention is made by NRC or state of Maine officials of any "site life cycle remediation cost estimates."



The one decommissioning option never mentioned by the NRC and the licensee, entombment is the likely decommissioning scenario of the future due to the high costs and political difficulties of off-site waste disposal. This option is clearly defined in NRC regulations. Recent NRC rule changes allow transfer of oversight responsibilities for "decommissioned reactors" to a committee of concerned citizens, e.g. environmentalists. Environmental radiation levels must be maintained at 15 µR-1. Establishment of an ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) at the time of decommissioning is permitted by the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act which includes a lengthy passage defining ISFSI regulations. One of many possible decommissioning scenarios would allow the Lincoln County Planning Commission, as administrator of both in-state and out-of-state vendor sponsored reactor and spent fuel wastes, to supplement the Wiscasset ISFSI costs with revenue enhancement from storing additional spent fuel generated courtesy of the South Korean Lightwater Reactor Agreement (Dec. 1995). The South Koreans are just one of many foreign and domestic waste generators seeking ISFS facilities within the U.S. as a result of waste disposal obligations inherent in both domestic and foreign DOE contract arrangements. If this seems a remote possibility, consider the 28 tons of foreign spent fuel now returning to the Savannah River Plant for reprocessing as a component of DOE contract agreements which are being observed. These DOE contract-derived wastes are just the tip of the iceberg of nuclear wastes looking for temporary storage facilities or waiting for reprocessing. If Maine's newly elected independent governor would be faithful to his devotion to favoring the interests of the most predatory commercial activities in a world of Darwinian corporate struggle-for-survival, why would the defacto high-level waste dump at Wiscasset not be expanded to meet the challenge of servicing the nuclear industry the state government so enthusiastically adulates? Monitored retrievable storage of foreign spent fuel has the potential to be an extremely lucrative business, and the MYAPC site has a very convenient location adjacent to an accessible deep water bay. Aerial surveillance reveals two excellent near-site locations for an ISFS facility near Wiscasset: Chewonki Neck and the "north-side parcel," either or both of which would provide a convenient location for a semi-permanent or permanent well-landscaped sculpture garden of interesting dry cask storage containers of one design or another. Under any conditions, the likely scenario for MYAPC generated spent fuel is not monitored retrievable storage in Nevada as proposed by current legislation proposed in Congress (Feb. 1997). When it comes to nuclear waste, what looks great on paper is usually extremely difficult to implement for political and economic reasons. The more likely scenario is the devolution of waste storage responsibilities to the local level; this is both more consistent with current government deregulation efforts and also much cheaper to fund. The town of Wiscasset is not only a principal beneficiary of the generation of nuclear electricity, but the likely location of MYAPC ratepayer entitlements, i.e. spent fuel waste. The tip off that MYAPC derived spent fuel will be difficult to move is the current failure not only to fund, design and construct the multipurpose canister system necessary to move the fuel, but to publicly discuss the issue and the many relevant unfunded decommissioning obligations. In Maine, the denial mechanisms of a predatory state government have been very effective at postponing the day of reckoning. Recent developments at MYAPC clearly indicate that the sophisticated public relations efforts essential to the continued operation of MYAPC pyramid scheme (public relations - the governor's greatest forte) are grossly inadequate to postpone the twilight of the nuclear era in Maine.

Recent budget cutbacks at the OCRWM (Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management) have resulted in the termination of the DOE program for designing a modern multipurpose canister system. The MPC system was to be used at all nuclear facilities for on-site monitored retrievable storage of spent fuel, or its transport to either a temporary or permanent repository. Any NRC licensee seeking to utilize MPC technology in the future will have to obtain this equipment from the private sector. The lack of a uniform design and the involvement of for-profit corporations in the future design and construction of this equipment will result in greatly increased costs for utilities choosing to use this technology. The rationalization for the termination of this program may be that there is no sense in wasting tax dollars if there is no certain destiny for spent fuel (e.g. Yucca Mountain). One immediate effect of the cancellation of the MPC program is to promote reliance on the much more primitive dry cask technology for spent fuel storage. This older technology utilizes cement casks which are not portable and have a much more limited life expectancy than the modern MPC system; use of dry casks implies the spent fuel will not be going anywhere. Dry cask storage has one advantage over an MPC system: it is much less expensive. This is one more component of the collapse of the nuclear energy pyramid scheme.


That the Attorney General of Maine and the Maine Public Utility Commission instigate legal action to establish an escrow account for the decommissioning of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, including the funding of radioactive waste storage and disposal costs, and that this escrow account be funded, prior to any ratepayer contributions, by the stockholders and sponsors of the MYAPC up to the full value of their equity in and proportionate ownership of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.

MYAPC Proposition Update - 5/18/97

In view of the recent decision by the owners of MYAPC to sell their nuclear generating facility in Wiscassett, the above proposition, first published in Legacy for Our Children in 1993, is revised as follows:

That any and all proceeds from the sale of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC) be set aside in an escrow account for the purpose of payment of unfunded radioactive waste storage, disposal and decommissioning costs incurred by the construction and operation of this facility, and that this escrow account function as a supplement to the existing MYAPC decomissioning fund and the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) mill-rate fund for final deep geologic disposal.

That, as noted above, these costs be funded, prior to any rate payer contribution, by the stockholders and sponsors of the MYAPC up to the full value of their equity in and proportionate ownership of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, and that this escrow account function as a supplement to the existing decommisssioning fund and the 1982 NWPA mill-rate fund.

That no proceeds from the sale of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company be applied to any stranded costs other then those pertaining to unfunded radioactive waste storage, disposal and decommisssioning costs, including the purchase and use of a multipurpose canister (MPC) system to establish on site spent fuel storage as the first stage of an integrated high level waste management system.

That in the event the collection of these three funds (escrow, decommissioning, mill-rate) is insufficient to pay for waste storage, disposal and decomissioning funding, that the original owners of the MYAPC assume responsibility for these unfunded costs, prior to any rate payer contributions up to the full value of profits derived from the generation of nuclear wastes at this facility since 1972.


Brack, H.G. (Ed.). (1993). Legacy for our children: The unfunded costs of decommissioning the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. Pennywheel Press, Hulls Cove, ME.

Environmental Protection Agency. (1982). Draft environmental impact statement: Environmental standards for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level and transuranic radioactive wastes. Report No. 520/1-82-025. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C.

Jackson, Shirley A. (April 29, 1997). Testimony April 29, 1997, Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the House Commerce Committee, Energy and Power Subcommittee concerning high-level waste legislation. Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. (1992). Spent fuel storage at Maine Yankee. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Augusta, ME. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company. (1993). Maine Yankee: A potential site for low-level radioactive waste storage or disposal. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Augusta, ME.

Malestskos, C.J. (1989). Radioactivities in the cycle of a potential low-level radioactive waste repository in Maine: A report to the Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority. Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority, Augusta, ME.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory. (1992). Integrated data base for 1992: U.S. spent fuel and radioactive waste inventories, projections and characteristics. Technical Report DOE/RW-0006, Rev. 8. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. (1995). Integrated data base report 1994: U.S. spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste inventories, projection and characteristics. Report No. DOE/RW-0006, Rev. 11. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN. TLG Engineering, Inc. (1987). Decommissioning study for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. No place of publication listed. TLG Engineering, Inc. (1993). Decommissioning cost study for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. No place of publication listed. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1988). General requirements of the nuclear regulatory commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities. Fed. Reg. 53-24015 to 24055. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. Vanags, U. (1992). A study of radioactive wastes. Maine State Planning Office, Augusta, ME.


Two fundamental groups of legal issues confront the MYAPC and its sponsors, supporters, and ratepayers in the twilight of the nuclear era, a twilight which the MYAPC both characterizes and nourishes. The most pressing and obvious legal issues pertain to the questions raised by the whistleblower's letter, investigated by the NRC, and now pending before the office of the U.S. Attorney for Maine, U.S. Dept. of Justice: did MYAPC and YAEC (and possibly some officials at the NRC) deliberately and fraudulently manipulate computer data for the purposes of misrepresenting the capacities of the emergency core cooling system and the reactor vessel containment for the purpose of obtaining (three) illegal power up-rates? These power up-rates resulted in a windfall to the corporate sponsors of MYAPC of +/-100 million dollars. To what extent did MYAPC and YAEC employees violate NRC regulations, federal laws, or engage in a conspiracy for the purpose of profit? To put the question in a slightly different way, did these employees and corporate sponsors engage in a pattern of criminal activity which would justify prosecution under U.S. Code Title 18 Sections 1961-1968 (Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act)? Most of the following citations and reports deal with this first group of legal issues.

The second fundamental legal issue confronting the MYAPC and its sponsors, supporters and ratepayers also relates to violation of NRC regulations and federal law. The 1981 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities (Fed. Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988) clearly mandate funding nuclear waste storage, transportation and disposal costs at the time of the generation of the radioactive wastes. Who is responsible for the failure to comply with these federal regulations? Why does the NRC, as well as the federal government not enforce its own regulations and laws? Who was responsible for this failure and who profits as a result of this enforcement failure? What is the relationship between this group of legal issues and the huge profits which result from this funding failure, and the first group of legal issues pertaining to falsification of computed data and the huge profits that derived from these illegal activities? A second component of the legal issues arising from the failure to fund the storage and disposal of MYAPC radioactive wastes relates to the role of the State of Maine and its long-time support of the evasion of these inevitable costs. What role has the offices of Governor, Public (corruption) Advocate, State Planning Office, Human Services and State Nuclear Safety Advisor played in the evasion of these costs, and what is their responsibility for the huge waste disposal and decommissioning deficits, the future payment of which is the legal obligation of Maine's electrical utility ratepayers? The following citations and reports pertain to either one or both of these groups of legal issues.

Center for Biological Monitoring. (1993). The failure to fund nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station: A commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities. Fed Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988. Prepared for the Office of Attorney General, Augusta, Maine.

Center for Biological Monitoring. (October, 1994). Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company non-compliance update, re: The failure to fund nuclear waste storage and disposal at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station: a commentary on violations of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the general requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for decommissioning nuclear facilities. Prepared for the Office of Attorney General, Augusta, Maine. Fed. Reg. 53-24015 to 24055, 1988. Sellman, M. (March 8, 1997). An open letter to the citizens of Maine: Maine Yankee. Bangor Daily News, Bangor, ME. [Mike Sellman is the President of Maine Yankee.] Silkman, R. (1987). The effects of a mandatory early shutdown of Maine Yankee, Maine State Planning Office. Maine State Planning Office, Augusta, ME. U. S. Department of Energy. (September, 1995). Analysis of the total system life cycle cost for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program. DOE/RW-0479. U.S. DOE, Washington, D.C.

U. S. Department of Energy. (October 1996). Nuclear waste fund fee adequacy: An assessment. DOE/RW-0490. U.S. DOE, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Washington, D.C.

U. S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney, District of Maine. (March 14, 1997). Information. Cirm. No. 97-(18 U.S.C. §1905). United States District Court, Portland, Maine.
United States of America v. Edouard H. Trottier

The United States Attorney Charges:


On or about September 20, 1996, in the District of Maine, the defendant,


an officer and employee of the United States and of a department and agency thereof, to wit, a Project Manager in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ('NRC'), published, divulged, disclosed and made known in a manner and to an extent not authorized by law, information coming to him in the course of his employment and official duties and by reason of an examination and investigation made by and a report and record made to and filed with the NRC, which information concerned and related to, among other things, the identity of persons; to wit, defendant


transmitted to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ('Maine Yankee'), a subject of an NRC Office of Investigations ('OI') investigation concerning the alleged deliberate failure of Maine Yankee to comply with NRC requirements regarding the adequacy of Maine Yankee's emergency core cooling system, portions of a confidential OI Investigative Report which contained the allegations and conclusions of the NRC investigation and the identities of certain individuals with information who had been identified in that investigation,

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1905.

Dated: March 13, 1997

Donald E. Clark
Assistant U.S. Attorney
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (January 3, 1996). Confirmatory order suspending authority for and limiting power operation and containment pressure (effective immediately) and demand for information (TAC No. M94194). Docket No. 50-309; License No. DPR-36; EA-96003. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (May 8, 1996). Office of the Inspector General event inquiry: NRC staff's actions related to regulation at Maine Yankee (Case No. 96-04S). United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C. United States Senate. (January 21, 1997). S. 104: A bill: To amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. 105th Congress, 1st Session, introduced by Murkowski et. al.

C. Brief to the United States Attorney for Maine Jay McCloskey (Dec. 15, 1995), pertaining to a request for an investigation of these falsifications and misrepresentations.

D. Request for an Investigation by the FBI, Posted on December 29, 1995, regarding the ongoing fraud and malfeasance at Maine Yankee.

E. A Letter to Shirley Jackson, Chair of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, posted on January 9, 1996

Shirley Ann Jackson
Chair of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

January 5, 1996

Dear Chair Jackson:

In regard to the allegations of the criminal falsification of data at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the resulting illegal power up-rate I have the following questions:

Do you intend to seek an impartial (e.g. independent of any ongoing NRC inquiry) investigation of the indictable offenses which have been noted in the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company up-rate scam which includes egregious alterations of documents pertaining to the emergency core cooling system, et cetera?

Do you intend to seek the assistance of independent council (see 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 591 et seq.) in the investigation of probable NRC involvement in the up-rate scam, including an investigation of the possibility of NRC knowledge of illegal up-rates at other nuclear facilities? Do you believe criminal and/or civil litigation against Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the Yankee Atomic Electric Company under Title 18 Section 1961-1968 (Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act) is justified by the patterns of behavior which have occurred in execution of, or by the substantial financially gains (+/-$100 million) which resulted from, this illegal power up-rate? Would you kindly provide a written reply, for the public record in Maine, of your responses to these inquiries?

Yours truly,

H.G. Brack
Director, Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-00012

February 29, 1996

Mr. H. G. Brack, Director
Center for Biological Monitoring, Inc.
P. O. Box 144
Hulls Cove, Maine 04644

Dear Mr. Brack:

I am responding to your letter dated January 5, 1996, regarding the allegation that Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC), acting as agent for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo), knowingly performed inadequate analyses to support two license amendments to increase the rated thermal power at which Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station may operate and that MYAPCo was cognizant of these inadequate analyses, yet misrepresented them to the NRC in seeking the license amendments, which were subsequently granted. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission received the allegation on December 4, 1995.

With respect to the issue of inadequate analyses, the NRC conducted a technical review and evaluation of the circumstances and records surrounding the license amendments to increase the station's rated thermal power. Based on the results of that review and on a transcribed public meeting held with MYAPCo on December 18, 1995, at our headquarters here in Rockville, Maryland, the NRC staff determined that the computer code used by Maine Yankee to demonstrate, in part, compliance with our emergency core cooling system (ECCS) requirements has not been applied in a manner conforming to NRC requirements. Accordingly, the staff considers it unacceptable for the plant to operate at its currently-licensed maximum, thermal power rating of 2700 MWt.

The NRC staff issued a Confirmatory Order and Demand for Information on January 3, 1996, which detail these findings and order station power reduced to 2440 MWt (about 90% of 2700 MWt). The Demand for Information required that MYAPCo, before restarting the plant, complete additional reviews and technical evaluations in support of operating Maine Yankee at 2440 MWt and provide the results to NRC under oath of affirmation. After the information required by the Demand for Information was received by the NRC, MYAPCo restarted the plant on January 11, 1996. Our on-site Resident Inspectors report that the plant is operating satisfactorily at 2440 MWt as of this date.

On January 23 through 25, 1996, an NRC inspection was conducted at the plant and at the Yankee Atomic Electric Company. The inspectors, accompanied by observers from the State of Maine, reviewed MYAPCo's additional technical evaluations and material supporting operation at 2440 MWt. All conditions for plant restart were verified satisfactory with no outstanding technical issues remaining.

The NRC staff plans to hold a public meeting near Maine Yankee to discuss the results of its technical reviews and inspections. This meeting is being planned for March, but we will publish the date, time, and location of the meeting in the local media as soon as it is scheduled.

In response to your questions about investigation of MYAPCo's allegedly misrepresenting information to NRC in seeking license amendments, NRC's Office of Investigations is responsible for investigating false statements made to the NRC, either by licensees or contractors and investigating the allegations of wrongdoing against Maine Yankee and YAEC. The Office of Investigations coordinates with other investigative agencies and refers investigative findings that indicate criminal wrongdoing to the Department of Justice and FBI for further investigation and possible criminal prosecution, as appropriate. Consequently, the NRC would not refer the Maine Yankee and YAEC allegations for an outside investigation until the current OI investigation is completed, and then only as warranted by the investigative findings.

For the same reasons, we are not seeking the assistance of independent counsel in the investigation of allegations of irregularities in NRC's approval of the power uprate for the Maine Yankee plant. The procedures governing the appointment of an independent counsel are set forth in the Ethics in Government Act at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599. The Act gives the Attorney General authority to seek the appointment of an independent counsel only when the conditions of the statute are met. The allegations to which you refer do not satisfy these conditions. The NRC's independent Office of the Inspector General, however, has jurisdiction over allegations of malfeasance by NRC employees and is reviewing the Maine Yankee and YAEC allegations, and any possible staff involvement.

Moreover, prosecution of violations of the Racketeering Influences and Corrupt Organization Act are not within the purview of the NRC. As I previously stated above, NRC's Office of Investigations will refer findings of potential criminal wrongdoing to the Department of Justice and FBI for further investigation and criminal prosecution, as appropriate.

If you need additional information or if you have any questions, you may want to contact NRC's Project Manager for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, Mr. Ed Trottier. Mr. Trottier can be reached by telephone at (301) 415-1427.


Summary Notice for a Petition for Indictment

  1. Failure to fund radioactive storage and disposal costs at the time these wastes were generated is a violation of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations.
  2. Mandatory future payment of radioactive waste storage and disposal costs by Maine citizens who did not benefit the nuclear generation of electricity which created these wastes is a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
  3. The return to service of corroded steam generators suffering from multiple degradation mechanisms, in lieu of their replacement with new equipment, is an act of criminal negligence.
  4. The fraudulent alteration of computer data and emergency core cooling system and reactor vessel proficiency reports is a violation of federal law and NRC license requirements.
  5. The illegal power up-rate which resulted from these fraudulent misrepresentations yielded +/- $100,000,000 in what may be the largest case of fraud in the history of Maine.
  6. The imminent return to service of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and the resumption of the production of 1,000 curies of high-level waste per hour of operation is an illegal act and, in view of the deteriorated condition of the Maine Yankee facilities, constitutes a reckless disregard for public safety.
  7. The above acts of malfeasance and negligence join to demonstrate that the commercial activities of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company constitute clear evidence of a lucrative pattern of interstate criminal activity which can and should be prosecuted under the civil and criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C.A. sections 1961 et seq. (R.I.C.O.).
  8. The failure to act by the attorney general and the governor of Maine to protect Maine citizens from the predatory impact of these federally sponsored activities constitutes both nonfeasance and a de facto obstruction of the administration of justice.
KEY WORD INDEX: badge of fraud, confidence game, conspiracy, corpus delecti, crimen falsi, deceit, indictable offenses, irreparable injury, malum in se, misprision of felony, moral turpitude, necessary inference, piercing the corporate veil, probable cause, quid pro quo, scienter, ultra hazardous activity, unjust enrichment, unconscionable, vicarious liability, white collar crime

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